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## UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

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## **SUMMARY ORDER**

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO SUMMARY ORDERS FILED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1 AND FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1. IN A BRIEF OR OTHER PAPER IN WHICH A LITIGANT CITES A SUMMARY ORDER, IN EACH PARAGRAPH IN WHICH A CITATION APPEARS, AT LEAST ONE CITATION MUST EITHER BE TO THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE NOTATION: "(SUMMARY ORDER)." A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF THAT SUMMARY ORDER TOGETHER WITH THE PAPER IN WHICH THE SUMMARY ORDER IS CITED ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS THE SUMMARY ORDER IS AVAILABLE IN AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE WHICH IS PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE WITHOUT PAYMENT OF FEE (SUCH AS THE DATABASE AVAILABLE AT HTTP://WWW.CA2.USCOURTS.GOV/). IF NO COPY IS SERVED BY REASON OF THE AVAILABILITY OF THE ORDER ON SUCH A DATABASE, THE CITATION MUST INCLUDE REFERENCE TO THAT DATABASE AND THE DOCKET NUMBER OF THE CASE IN WHICH THE ORDER WAS ENTERED.


At a Stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York, on the 24<sup>th</sup> day of April, two thousand and eight.

## PRESENT:

HON. PIERRE N. LEVAL. HON. GUIDO CALABRESI, Circuit Judges, HON. ALAN H. NEVAS, District Judge.\* SERGEY MORGORICHEV, Petitioner-Appellee, No. 00-2406-pr -V.-MICHAEL B. MUKASEY,1 Respondent-Appellant.

<sup>\*</sup> The Honorable Alan H. Nevas, of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, sitting by designation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey has been substituted for former Attorney General John Ashcroft as the respondent in this case.



In 1998, Morgorichev filed a habeas petition in the Eastern District of New York, arguing that the BIA and the IJ erred in retroactively applying the limitations on section 212(c) relief enacted by Congress in 1996.<sup>2</sup> The district court granted the habeas petition on June 20, 2000,

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> In 1996, section 440(d) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1227 (Apr. 24, 1996), limited the availability of 212(c) relief for aliens convicted of aggravated felonies. Later that year, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009 (Sept. 30, 1996). Section 304(b) of IIRIRA repealed INA section 212(c).

and the government appealed. The appeal has been held in abeyance pending the decisions of this Court in *Calcano-Martinez v. INS*, 232 F.3d 328 (2d Cir. 2000), *aff'd*, 533 U.S. 348 (2001), *St. Cyr v. INS*, 229 F.3d 406 (2d Cir. 2000), *aff'd*, 533 U.S. 289 (2001), as well as in *Rankine v. Reno*, 319 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2003). We assume the parties' familiarity with the facts, procedural history, and scope of the issues presented on appeal.

During the pendency of this appeal, Congress passed the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, 119 Stat. 231, 302 (May 11, 2005), "significantly affect[ing] the procedure for disposing of a habeas petition that . . . challenged a final order of removal." *Wilson v. Gonzales*, 471 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 2006). We have held that in these cases the appeal is converted to a petition for review brought under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. *Id.* In so doing, we review the underlying deportation order, "vacating as a nullity the district court's decision below." *Moreno-Bravo v. Gonzales*, 463 F.3d 253, 257 (2d Cir. 2006). And, as a petitioner's eligibility for a section 212(c) waiver "is a question of law, unlike the discretionary and unreviewable decision of whether such a waiver ultimately should be granted," our review of the issue is *de novo. Blake v. Carbone*, 489 F.3d 88, 98 n.7 (2d Cir. 2007).

The government contends that this case is squarely covered by our decision in *Rankine*, 319 F.3d at 99-100, in which we determined that the congressional elimination of section 212(c) relief is not impermissibly retroactive as applied to those aliens who, after trial, were convicted of aggravated felonies before 1996. We reached this conclusion in the case of Rankine and his co-petitioners on the ground that, unlike aliens who had *pled* guilty to aggravated felonies, these aliens had not relied on the availability of such relief.<sup>3</sup> Morgorichev challenges our rationale in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Morgorichev does not contend that he delayed seeking 212(c) relief relying on the continued availability of such relief, an argument that remains open to such litigants post-*Rankine*. *See Restrepo v. McElroy*, 369 F.3d 627, 634-35 (2d Cir. 2004); *see also Walcott v. Chertoff*, 517 F.3d 149, 154-55 (2d Cir. 2008).

1	Rankine as in conflict with the Supreme Court's retroactivity analysis in Landgraf v. USI Film
2	Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1944), and in violation of principles of equal protection.
3	These arguments are unavailing. The Court's decision in <i>Rankine</i> addresses both issues.
4	See Rankine, 319 F.3d at 98, 103. And we are bound by Rankine "unless and until its rationale is
5	overruled, implicitly or expressly, by the Supreme Court or this court en banc." In re
6	Sokolowski, 205 F.3d 532, 534-35 (2d Cir. 2000) (quotation marks omitted).
7	Morgorichev further contends that the regulation implementing the various forms of
8	section 212(c) relief, see 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(g), violates equal protection by determining
9	eligibility for section 212(c) relief for criminals, otherwise similarly situated, based on the timing
10	of the commencement of their deportation proceedings. The regulation, however, is a
11	permissible implementation of Congress's intention in passing the Antiterrorism and Effective
12	Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), which, as we have held, was precisely to effectuate this line-
13	drawing. See Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106, 130 (2d Cir. 1998). Although Morgorichev
14	argues that the government might have manipulated the timing of proceedings in order to prevent
15	aliens from receiving 212(c) relief, we note that the record does not demonstrate any
16	unreasonable delay in the commencement of Morgorichev's deportation proceedings.
17	We have considered all of Petitioner-Appellee's claims and find them to be without
18	merit. For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the district court's grant of habeas, and DENY
19	the petition for review.
20 21 22 23 24 25 26	FOR THE COURT:  Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
27	By: